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A lot has already been written on Heinrich von Kleist's "Über das Marionettentheater" ("On 
the Marionette Theater"). I will engage in a reading that is based on deconstructivist 
approaches as well as on queer- and cyberfeminist-thoughtboth of which reform concepts of 
the subject by taking into question bodily and gender coherence and gender identity. Queer 
Studies provoke a thinking of the multiplication of difference as well as a thinking of 
difference within ('entities') rather than of difference between ('entities'). Cyberfeminism 
explores the possibilities of manipulating and changing the physical body and provides 
metaphors for thinking 'posthuman' identities. Donna Harawayin allusion to the hybridization 
of gender relations and gender conceptionsposits the cyborg as a leading figure/figuration of 
feminist politics. 
The focal point of my reading will be the so-called 'Gliedermann', the godlike puppet on the 
stringsone of the protagonist figures in Kleist's text. I will conceptualize the 'Gliedermann', 
the puppet, as cyborg and, in relation to the protagonist figure of a Japanese Manga and its 
cinematic adaptation, as a 'Ghost in the Shell'. Via the metaphor of the cyborg, the theorizing 
of a new episteme, which is implicated in the technological revolution, can be carried out, 
since the "cyborg identity, embodying both nature and 'other', belongs neither wholly to 
nature nor to culture and subverts all certainties" (Smith and Watson, 1998, 40)and this might 
add new aspects to a reading of Kleist's text. 
Kleist's "On the Marionette Theater," written in 1810, is an imagined account of a dialogue 
with a Herr C. -, a dancer, concerning the nature of the art of puppetry. Kleist's narrator and 
Herr C. engage in a discourse on the mystery of movement, on the impossibility of 
duplicating the beauty of a single motion, on the importance of the center of gravity, on the 
nature of grace and on the 'antigravitational' freedom of the puppet, hence on a series of 
questions that outline the content of Kleist's story, that indeed is said to be a "text that means 
too much" (Ray, 1979, 521). The text has provoked numerous variations of critical 
encounters, since it "touches on aesthetics, theology, the mechanics of marionettes, history, 
consciousness, affectation, the self and the Fall" (521). Hence the text 'touches' ideas of 
deracination, displacement, confusion, dislocation - all of which are central aspects in Kleist's 
works. Kleist's text can be described as enigmatic in content and ruptured in its narration. 
Perhaps one could even regard it as decentered and 'wounded' qua figurations of 
fragmentation and mutilation. Those figurations are, among others, the sparepartlike or 
machinelike figures of the cripples with mechanical legs which allow their owners to perform 
graceful movementsnot despite, but because of, their prostheses, or, the 'Thornpuller', 
'decentered' by trying to repeat a graceful movement; or, figurations that break up the frontiers 
between human and animal, like the fencing bear, and last but not least, the fragmented but 
gracious puppet on the strings, the 'godlike Gliedermann', the marionette, the figure, that gives 
the name to this strange piece of text. Kleist's text could be described or circumscribed as a 
'Körpertext', a textual body, or, as Bettine Menke puts it, regarding another figure in Kleist's 
work (Penthesilea): "Bodies function as emblems for questions of the text about the frontiers 
of the understandable and nameable" (1997, 127, my translation). All those fragmentations 
and deviations of a norm, exposed through the described bodies, provoke a reading which questions what is assumed to be human or what or who qualifies as human and how this 
human quality is constructed. 
My starting-point and basic understanding of the condition of human identities - that are 
always already gendered identities - is bound to the hypothesis that those identities, to follow 
Judith Butler's notion of performativity, are effects of a performative process of identity-
construction. This performative process is closely connected to what Butler calls "the 
tropological inauguration of the subject" - as a result of the performative power of tropes 
(1997, 121). Those are reflections that obviously relate to Paul de Man's concept of a 
'performative rhetoric' and that are crucial for her rhetorical-performative account of identity-
construction. I will not discuss this in depth here but want to point out the importance of 
Butler's as well as de Man's drawing upon rhetorical figures or on the tropological system 
respectively, while theorizing the subject and the human condition. 
The reading strategies, I suggest, are: reading rhetorically by 'using' certain tropes as 
instruments of analysis. The figures to approach these problems under question are: 
bodymetaphors as metaphors of hybridityhereinafter formulated as posthuman-body, hybrid 
body, monster, hermaphrodite and, above all, cyborgmetaphors that can be regarded as 
attempts to rethink and refigure the body via tropes of hybridity and to express the aporetic 
constitution of what is called an 'identity' or the 'human condition'. The 'object' of these 
attempts could be grasped as Kleist's 'Gliederman', but we could even consider the figure of 
the Gliedermann as the 'embodiment of rhetoric'thus, at the same time as instrument. This 
means, then, that we cannot talk of an object in a classic sense, since the object and the 
method refer to each other in an inseparable way. The representations of identities are being 
examined from the point of view of their rhetorical and figurative structures, and the mode of 
representation is always already part of the methodological knowledge of rhetoric. Meta-
language and object-language intertwine. However, my usage of the concept of metaphor (in 
cyberspace) with either its set of names for rhetorical figures, i.e., prosopopeia, metalepsis, 
prosthesis, et cetera, and, moreover, with the cyborg as metaphor for a hybrid identity, seems 
far-fetched regarding classical definitions. Indeed, the concept of metaphor itself, as we have 
to acknowledge, has undergone innumerable modifications, classifications and adaptations. 
A rhetorical reading and understanding of identity-construction deals with the constitutive 
functions of language. Referring to a rhetorical figure, namely, to 'prosthesis', gives a first 
access to our theme. This figure, traditionally circumscribed as 'supplement' to heighten 
effects, canin a modified waybe understood as a fundamental aspect of language itself, since 
language only represents qua abstractions, amplifications and substitutions which could 
otherwise not be conceived or understood. 'Prosthesis', then, can be regarded as fundamentally 
inherent in the possibility of representation and understanding in the first place. Hence, I'm 
going to talk about prosthetic identities, not very 'human' or 'natural' in a classic 
understanding of this term, since, if one considers something as prosthetically 'given' qua 
language, qua rhetoric, it is not 'natural' in the proper sense. What is considered as 'nature' and 
as 'human' must be naturalized, performatively, as we will see later, according to a theoretical 
account of Judith Butler. The 'inhuman', however, following Paul de Man's reflections, "is not 
some kind of mystery or some kind of secret; the inhuman is: linguistic structures, the play of 
linguistic tensions, linguistic events that occur, possibilities which are inherent in 
languageindependently of any intent or any drive or any wish or any desire we might have" 
(1986, 96). 
What de Man calls the 'inhuman', indeed, seems to be the only way to conceive something as 
human. However, it could be worthwhile to break up this opposition, thus, dealing with a figuration of Kleist, I would like to take Kleist's 'Gliedermann' as the embodiment of this 
in/human touch of language. Within the figure of the godlike 'Gliedermann' in Kleist, the 
contradiction and aporia of the definition of humanity should become conceivable. Reading 
embodiment as prosthesis could be a strategy to avoid remaining stuck within binary 
oppositions and to think of concepts of humanity or of 'being human' otherwise. Keeping 
these considerations in mind, one could ask: How can one link together Kleist's figure, its 
rhetorical and prosthetic constitution and the figures of post-modern cyberworlds? Let me 
first outline this approach theoretically with Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, both 
referring to Donna Haraway and the so-called 'embodiment' of 'posthuman bodies' (or 
'posthumanist' bodies - terms that would suggest that the days of the human may be 
numbered): 
Posthuman bodies are not slaves to masterdiscourses but emerge at nodes where bodies, 
bodies of discourse, and discourse of bodies intersect to foreclose any easy distinction 
between actor and stage, between sender/receiver, channel, code, message, context. 
Posthuman embodiment, like Haraway's 'feminist embodiment', then, is not about fixed 
location in a reified body, female or otherwise, but about nodes in fields, inflections in 
orientations[...]. Embodiment is significant prosthesis. (1995, 2, my emphasis) 
Thus, the emergence of the body, the embodiment, is only conceivable as a so-called 
'posthuman body', as a body, which is not representable or objective anymore. Embodiment as 
significant prosthesis intimates the reappearance of the body and the paradox evocation of 
reference via the prosthetic function of language. The question here, will be, whether the lost 
identity, the naturalness, the completeness can or cannot be regained by means of language as 
prosthesis. What other rhetorical ways are available to approach prosthetic, post-human 
refigurations of identity-concepts? 
Let us turn to Paul de Man's recasting of the term human. Even if he does not address the 
body as 'post-human'-body at all, he nevertheless questions what is said to be human by and 
through the trope of prosopopeia: "Man can address and face other men, within life or beyond 
the grave, because he has a face, but he has a face only because he partakes of a mode of 
discourse that is neither entirely natural nor entirely human" (de Man, "Wordsworth and the 
Victorians," 1984, 90). Let us look more in depth at what prosopopeia means: "Prosopopeia is 
the trope of autobiography, by which one's name [...] is made as intelligible and memorable as 
a face" (de Man, "Autobiography as De-Facement," 1984, 76). This would suggest, as 
Cynthia Chase emphasizes, that "face is given by prosopopoeia" (Chase, "Giving a Face to a 
Name," 1986, 84), and this figure constitutes the subject of speech in the first place - as 
figure, as face, as voice. The subject of speech seems to be always already given, but at the 
same time it is obstructed by the dynamic of figuration and its effects: "The rhetorical figure 
of prosopopeia communicates the conferring of figure/face/ voice that were originally missing 
and hence refers to its own meta-figurative double-structure of figuration and disfiguration." 
(Menke, 1992, 437, my translation). Prosopopeia posits or figures and disfigures at the same 
time, because it communicates its own positing within a self-referential gesture. Faces, names 
and gender-identities are given, or, as Cynthia Chase puts it: "Face is not the natural given of 
the human person. It is given in a mode of discourse, given by an act of language. What is 
given by this act is figure. Figure is not less than our very face" (Chase, "Giving a Face to a 
Name," 1986, 84). What is identified as being posited or given cannot be proper or essential 
or, more precisely, what is defined as the product of a rhetorical operation cannot be regarded 
as a 'natural' category but as a rhetorical one (cf. Menke, 1992, 441, my translation). The face or the voice that is 'given' belongs to an 'I' that can no longer be regarded as a stable 
human 'I' but rather has to be located at the horizon beyond such definitions and above all 
does not speak as one. The 'I' in the text is always another 'I', is a substitute or supplementary 
'I', a textual 'I' through figural transformation and hence effect of writing and reading. The 
'textual being' relates to the 'sexual being' of the body. The borders of understanding run 
alongside the 'textual body', the 'Körpertext', which is a 'posthuman' or 'posthumanist' text, 
according to the style and diction of postmodern metaphors of technology. Being human and 
thinking of oneself as a 'self' means first of all being embodied, and, being named. Moreover, 
as outlined by de Man, 
the attributes of centrality and of selfhood are being exchanged in the medium of the 
language. [...] The self can only persist as self if it is displaced into the text that denies it. The 
self which was at first the center of the language as its empirical referent now becomes the 
language of the center as fiction, as metaphor of the self. What was originally a simple 
referential text now becomes the text of a text, the figure of a figure. The deconstruction of 
the self as a metaphor does not end in the rigorous separation of the two categories (self and 
figure) from each other but ends instead in an exchange of properties that allows for their 
mutual persistence at the expense of literal truth. By calling the subject a text, the text calls 
itself, to some extent, a subject. (de Man, "Rhetoric of Tropes (Nietzsche)," 1979, 111f.) 
De Man's metaphorization and textualization of the self can be regarded as an argument along 
a similar line to Halberstam/Livingston, who tell us that we cannot make any easy distinction 
between actor and stage, between sender/receiver, channel, code, message, context and so on. 
This argument would suggest that the semiotic closure of codes such as 'sex/gender', 
human/non-human, etc., self/text is not possible in general. Furthermore, such a conclusion 
proposes a shift towards a thinking that focuses on differences rather than binary oppositions. 
But, how can we think difference as non-identity, as irreducible difference, as post-human 
hybrid identity? Framing difference as différance might be one possibility. Différance, a term 
coined by Jacques Derrida, can be translated as both 'difference' and 'deferral'. Différance 
resists the either/or logic of binary oppositions and the privileging of one over the other, it 
refuses unity and closure and asserts the ultimate provisionality of meaning. Gayatri Spivak 
outlines the connection between difference and différance as well as between sexual identity 
and sexual difference: "Différance is [...] only one name for the irreducible double bind that 
allows the very possibility of difference(s). Sexual identity is sexual différance, not sexual 
difference; it produces sexual difference. [...] There is no harm in admitting that it is not just 
the production of sexual difference that is being framed here but the possibility of difference 
itself (1993, 132). Difference as différance asks for figurations of this term, since différance 
as abstract term is not easy to grasp. In my account, this figuration of an irreducible and 
always deferred in-betweenness is the godlike Gliedermann - recast as a cyborg existence, as 
a non-human, post-human identity. Bodies of cyborgs are said to be contaminated bodies, 
deadly bodies, techno-bodies, queer bodies and bodies of unfixed contours. In her essay 
"Reading Like an Alien" Kelly Hurley describes the "posthuman identity" by "body horror", 
that means, that the human 'subject' is being disintegrated, dismantled and "demolished": "a 
human body whose integrity is violated, a human identity whose boundaries are breached 
from all sides" (1995, 205). Here she is less concerned with the so-called 'postmodern' 
fragmentation of the body and its identity, but rather its (her/his) "reconfiguration through the 
pluralization and confusion of bodily forms" (205). What this means, then, is that what could 
be thought of as the specific 'human', providing a specific identity, erodes. The standard 
figures of the human/non-human are the monster, the alien, the mutant or the cyborg, all of 
them figuring as tropes for bodily ambiguation. Kleist's 'Gliedermann' is, according to de Man's rhetorical account of the characteristics of the 
figure, "the anamorphosis of a form detached from meaning and capable of taking on any 
structure whatever" (de Man, "Excuses (Confessions)," 1979, 294). We can read this in Kleist, 
concerning the manifestation of gracefulness. "Gracefulness reappears when knowledge has 
passed through an infinity-in such a way that it simultaneously is manifested most purely in 
that anthropomorphic structure, which has either no consciousness at all or which is infinite-
which is to say, either in the puppet or in God" (Kleist, 1985, my translation). Nikolaus 
Hellmayr calls Kleist's Gliedermann an "anthropomorphic machine" that becomes 
'anamorphic', that becomes the mechanical puppet out of which any materiality seems to be 
dissolved and which is being constituted only within its (interrupting) movements (cf. 1989, 
131). The mechanism of "anamorphosis" is, according to Cynthia Chase, an "effect in which 
representing an object from a special angle distorts and conceals its shape" ("Mechanical 
Doll," 1986, 144). Hence the object is being transformed, transmuted, contorted. The angle 
from which we view the object can never be the same, and any gaze is imperatively 
transforming. Anthropomorphism as anamorphism transforms but fails. Anthropomorphism 
as anamorphism enlivens a figure illusory, gives it an appearance and at the same time distorts 
it. The transformation simultaneously is a fixation, is a transformation, etc. However, what we 
are able to grasp is only a 'humanlike' figure, is a figure of interruption, a monstrous figure, a 
'reconfiguration through pluralization'. This leads to a 'confusion of bodily forms' that 
provokes or enforces a turn towards new figures of thought, towards new drafts of embodied 
id/entities, gendered id/entities. The figure of thought of a world characterized by 'postisms' is 
the cyborgor, as Donna Haraway would formulate it: 
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal 
symbiosis, unalienated labor, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final 
appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no 
origin story in the Western sensea "final" irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic 
telos of the "West's" escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied 
at last from all dependency, a man in space. (1991, 150) 
Considering Haraway's ideas, one cannot talk of an organic wholeness any more, not even of 
a higher unity through the appropriation of the power of all parts. What figures as a cyborg is 
contradictory and paradox per se, because he/she is presented mutilated and not identically 
human but at the same time 'overprovided' (cf. Gray, 1996, 400, my translation). Together 
with this figure of art in all its madness, we have to think of his/her 'mad gender' as well, since 
the question of gender is constitutive for being human, as emphasized by Judith Butler. Butler 
stresses the 'performative power' of language and discourse, and she describes the subject as 
an effect of the latter. One example she gives is compelling: It is the naming of the child, 
starting from a status of neuter, of it to a she or a he, and this naming, or "girling", as Butler 
puts it, "does not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by 
various authorities and throughout various intervals of time to reinforce or contest this 
naturalized effect" (1993, 8). What seems to be natural must be stabilized, and the 
interpellation into the natural gender must be repeated permanently, nature must be 
naturalized. Moreover, following Butler's train of thought: 
Such attributions or interpellations contribute to that field of discourse and power that 
orchestrates, delimits, and sustains that which qualifies as the human'. We see this most 
clearly in the examples of those abjected beings who do not appear properly gendered; it is 
their very humanness that comes into question. Indeed, the construction of gender operates 
through exclusionary means, such that the human is not only produced over and against the 
inhuman, but through a set of foreclosures, radical erasures [...]. Hence, it is not enough to claim that human subjects are constructed, for the construction of the human is a differential 
operation that produces the more and the less 'human', the inhuman, the humanly unthinkable. 
(1993, 8) 
The above-mentioned 'overprovided' cyborg comes close to what Butler calls 'abjected 
beings', that thus means, not being properly gendered. Yet Butler applies the construction of 
the human as something which occurs to all gendered beings through a set of foreclosures that 
fails, since it produces the more and the less human, the inhuman, the humanly unthinkable. 
The cyborg is one figure (among others) for the unthinkable in/human. Cyborgs often figure 
as hermaphrodites, and it is no coincidence that exactly within the figure of the cyborg the 
order of sex/gender is highly at stake, due to his/her paradoxical and lawless figuration: "Like 
the hermaphrodite, the cyborg is about 'transgressed boundaries', not only those between male 
and female, but also between human and animal, and between animal and machine." (Weil, 
1992, 160) 
Turning to Kleist again and to his usage of the term grace in his "Marionettentheater", the 
majority of the interpreters conclude that instead of a harmonization of body and soul, of 
sensuality and reason, grace is transformed into a kind of 'materialistic' way, that means 
reduced to a bodily substance without 'spirit' (Greiner, 1990, 98) or, even more radically, the 
lack of spirit turns out to be the condition of grace. To read it differently and with Kleist: his 
gracious Gliedermann is being moved by simple lines, by the holding of the strings, and those 
lines are 'mostly straight lines (that link the puppet and puppeteer) and nevertheless full of 
mystery and nothing other than the path of the dancer's soul" (cf. 1985, 340, my translation). 
Kleist's Gliedermann can be read as 'non-human', as 'animal'. It is animated mechanically, it is 
an animated machine, animated and spiritualized cyborg. In Kleist's text we have to deal with 
a non-conceptual, non-appropriate body, figured via the metaphor of the 'Gliedermann', the 
puppet, figured within the bodily construction that either has no or an endless consciousness - 
as Gliedermann or God (cf. 345, my translation). 
In allusion to Kleist's text Paul de Man's ideas lead to a radical deconstruction of language 
articulated through the metaphor of the body and its complete fragmentation and dissolution, 
which he, then, the other way round, applies to language itself: 
We must, in short, consider our limbs, hands, toes, breasts [...] in themselves, severed from 
the organic unity of the body [...] . We must, in other words, disarticulate, mutilate the body 
[...] . To the dismemberment of the body corresponds a dismemberment of language, as 
meaning-producing tropes are replaced by fragmentation of sentences and propositions into 
discrete words, or the fragmentation of words into syllables or finally letters. (1986, 88f.) 
De Man evokes the 'self-mutilation' inherent in language and takes the body as the perfect 
model for it. Kleist's text supplies an impressive picture for this: "This mutilated textual 
model exposes the wound of a fracture that lies hidden in all texts" ("Shelley Disfigured," 
1984, 120) That means: "If one speaks of the inhuman, the fundamental non-human character 
of language, one also speaks of the fundamental non-definition of the human as such [for] it is 
not at all certain that language is in any sense human" (1986, 87). According to Cynthia 
Chase, and as an allusion to the superiority of the artificial limbs of the dancing cripple, this 
idea of mutilation in Kleist's text can be read as a function of language that favorizes the 
figurative prosthetic gesture of it, a gesture that asserts gracefulness: "Kleist's text brings 
together, de Man shows, the deeply disquieting effect, the idea of a fall from grace, the loss of 
a state of nature or paradise which ultimately can be recovered, and the conception of art as 
prosthesis, for art, skill, or 'aesthetic education' as the means of such recovery" (1989, 46). Kleist's text has often been interpreted as his own 'spiritual autobiography', following the 
assumption that there existed a relation between the conception of the text and some 
occurrences in his own life or some very personal characteristics of himself. I would like to 
suggest not to try to construct such interconnections but, rather, to regard the figure of the 
Gliedermann (as cyborg) generally as 'figure of autobiography', yet in a very different way, 
namely, as a disfigured, de-faced figure, according to the gesture of the trope prosopopeia, 
which gives a face and at the same time withdraws it. This means, then, that this figure can 
rather be read as a figure of the interruption of any autobiographical reference and at the same 
time as interruption of the order of the sexes. Why should Kleist's figure be a man at all? How 
does the figure present itself? As a godlike principle that nevertheless is committed to Kleist's 
ironic, fragmented body. The gender of God has no sexually differentiated meaning, and 
within the role of the Savior sexual differences are neutralized, as Jan Dirk Müller emphasizes 
(cf. 1997, 88, my translation). Müller stages a picture of androgyny which promises 
wholeness and salvation, in which sexuality and destructibility vanish within the godlike 
principle. But, as one could put it, within the figure of the 'Gliedermann' this approach is just a 
slip of the tongue, the promise slips, which in German would be easier to express, the promise 
'verspricht sich' into a hermaphroditic diversity or variety. The transcendental ideal of the 
androgyne, hence the 'complete' god/dess that unites the male and female parts within one 
body, cannot be successfully figured within the metaphor of the Gliedermann. The 
hermaphroditic figure emerges and takes over the scene, the scene of differences, and blasts 
the boundaries of the sexes. 
The ways of the 'soul' of the godlike 'Gliedermann', as mentioned above, build crossroads 
with Masamune Shirow's animated film "Ghost in the Shell", which is based on the Manga of 
the same title (cf. Ito, 1995; Shirow, 1995).The 'hero' and protagonist of the film is Major 
Kusanagi, member of a special security unit of an unnamed country in the near future. Major 
Kusanagi is a cyborg. The linkage, again, between the 'Gliedermann' and the cyborg Major 
Kusanagi is the question of what qualifies as human and of how this humanity is being 
figured, disfigured and refigured. Monsters, goddesses and cyborgs, are, as Nina Lykke puts 
it, all three signifiers of chaos, heterogeneity and unstable identities, yet, despite their 
differences, one finds connections between them: 
Monsters have for thousands of years undermined the normal and the stable by their deviant 
appearances. The early worldmother-goddesses of ancient mythologies are often situated 
close to chaotic and undifferentiated primordial states. Cyborgs are grotesque post-industrial 
boundary figures, questioning the boundaries between human, organism and machine [...]. In 
spite of their differences, the three metaphorical figures are therefore related through their 
metonymical closeness to the non-orderly, non-stable, non-identical and so on. (1996, 5) 
Goddesses or ghosts or cyborgs are figurations of the 'in-between', of the non-identical, of the 
'other'. They question boundaries profoundly and are grotesque and familiar at the same time. 
They are somehow 'necessary' figurations of what has to be figured beyond intelligible 
identities, yet has to be figured nonetheless to become graspable. That means that the 'other' 
has to be figured to stand in difference to the supposed 'own', the 'real', the 'identical'. Ghosts 
figure "[a] certain virtuality, a relation to the other" and they are literature, as Derrik Attridge 
suggests: "the ghost is literature [...] . Literature appears to us, calls on us [...]. The ghost is 
prosopopeia and apostrophe in their most violent form" (1995, 224f.). Attridge refers to the 
trope of prosopopeia in correlation to his conception of the ghostly notion of literature itself. 
Hereinafter I will focus on some aspects of the concept of ghost within cyberworlds to arrive 
then, finally, at Kleist's Marionettentheater again. In Oshiis film, that is, in his adaptation of a Japanese Manga playing in the near future, 
cyborgs live together with 'real' people, mostly without knowing that they are artificially 
created. In this world of the future the substitution of fragile, sick or destroyed bodyparts by 
mechanical ones has become daily praxis. Major Kusanagi, our hero, is, as we already know, 
cyborg as well. She is the perfect function unit and she can change her shell or become 
invisible. Furthermore, she is capable of connecting her intercept set directly with her nervous 
system, which allows her to dive into computersystems directly, since hackers are all around 
and do not have any scruples about implanting false memories and synthetic experiences, 
hence utilizing the population of their country like marionettes (cf. Chute, 1997). 
Kusanagi consists mainly of spare parts since most of her 'natural' limbs and other body parts, 
injured or destroyed in the course of her professional duties, have been substituted through 
prostheses. Only a very little of her original grey brain mass has remained intact, yet, 
Kusanagi believes that her spirit (in German 'Geist', i.e. 'ghost') is still uninjured and whole. 
Kusanagi's ghost - in the sense of soul or consciousness - is able to live in the shell, either 
artificial or organic. Ghost means, for the time being, individual identity and is not bound to a 
real, organic body, a body out of flesh and blood: "Ghosts can move from organic to inorganic 
bodies, but an inorganic body cannot generate its own ghost", since: "identity is a uniquely 
human trait" (Ebert, 1996, 1). Ghost differentiates human beings from machines and this 
romanticizing principle seems to remain important even in the world of Cyberpunk. However, 
what happens if such a ghost starts to create itself out of itself and forces Major Kusanagi to 
rethink her concept fundamentally? This happens in the film at the moment when a highly 
developed computer program attains self-consciousness and independence and moves freely 
through the Internet. Soon it becomes known as the "Puppet Master", as the greatest hacker of 
all time (cf. 1). 
The hacker, the Puppet Master, is an agent that has been generated by the secret service itself. 
It is a being without a physical body, and it only becomes aware of its own existence in the 
course of its activities and its travelling through the Internet. This fact turns out to become a 
problem for its inventors. At the moment when the hacker appears for the first time in the 
shell of a female cyborg, it becomes apparent that he/she/it is something or someone that has 
not existed until this very moment, namely, an intelligent life form that has never been human 
in the first place. The so-called Puppet Master, fragment of a computer virus that has copied 
itself and in the course of this process has obtained wisdom, has seized a body in order to be 
able to ask for political asylum - a personal right that can be claimed by every other life form 
(cf. Chute, 1997) 
Oshii, the filmmaker, stages a vision that one could call a Second Creation. For Oshii the 
internet seems to be like the earth before the appearance of the first human being. He 
speculates about how a higher life form could emerge out of this endless sea of data, using 
metaphors related to Christianity as well as to Japanese mythology (cf. Möller, 1997). 
This philosophical dimension of the film can be revoked by a question of Paul de Man, 
referring to John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, namely what is the 
essence proper of man? or - what is the organic world in general? Maybe Kleist gives some 
answers: "We see that, in the world of animate matter, as self-consciousness becomes dimmer 
and weaker, to the same extent gracefulness manifests itself more and more radiantly and 
dominantly" (II, 345, my translation). In Kleist's text the artificial limbs are the more graceful 
ones, and also the fencing bear, a 'nonhuman' figure, is the more powerful, more agile and 
skillful one. The capacities of the cyborgs strikingly exceed those of human beings, and the 
superiority of the mechanical compared to human capacities leads to paradox matters in Kleist's text as well: "I said that, however skillfully he conducted the case of his paradox, he 
would still never make me believe that more grace could be contained in a mechanical jointed 
man than in the structure of the human body." (II, 342, my translation). 
In Kleist's text gracefulness is located beyond expectable esthetic categories; his worldorder - 
figured as the 'Gliedermann' or as God - is brittle and mutilated, artificial in any case. Kleist 
confers the 'ghost', the spirit, into the God figured as marionette, as puppet on the strings, 
since grace does not require a ghost - just as little as it requires power, precision and 
perfection on the part of the cyborg. Within the figure of the godlike Gliedermann as well as 
within Oshii's Science Fiction the contradiction of the definition of mankind becomes evident. 
Thereto, out of the dialogues of the film: "If a cyber could create its own ghost, what would 
be the purpose of being human?" The Puppet Master and the Gliedermann, both become 
legible as divine principle, able to create themselves out of themselves. They are confronting 
and challenging what is said to be human, or 'half-human', searching for a human host, as one 
could interpret the figure of the Savior. God and the Holy Spirit, united within the Holy 
Trinity with the One and Only who is able to represent them in a humanly shell. The 
Gliedermann as God is provided with no or with an endless consciousness in the same way as 
the Puppet Master, the agent, created by the 'ministry of foreign affairs'. The Puppet Master in 
Oshii's film is the Super Ghost, is the one who dominates the net and the one who has access 
to the knowledge or who figures all knowledge itself. He is the one who gains the utmost 
power as bodiless entity. 
In Kleist's text Mr. C. asks whether the machinist, the puppet master who controlled these 
dolls, had to be a dancer himself or at least had to have some idea about the esthetics of dance 
(cf. 340, my translation). What is at stake here is the soul or the ghost since the line the 
machinist, the puppet master, describes is nothing else than the ways of the dancer's soul, and 
Mr. C. doubts that such a line could be attained unless the puppet master placed himself in the 
center of gravity of the marionette, or, in other words, unless he danced (cf. II, 340, my 
translation). The machinist, the puppet master, transposed into the center of gravity, is dancer, 
is marionette, just as the Puppet Master in Oshii's film is the creator and the created one 
simultaneously, harboring two principles as a ghost in the host. 
What do ghosts intend, how are they figured and what do they perform?: "[W]hat might this 
ghost have to tell us? In speaking, it would seem an exemplum of the rhetorical figure of 
prosopopeia [...]. What might this prosopopeia be?" (Royle, 1990, 40) The ghost wants to fuse 
with Major Kusanagi, wants to give voice and face to himself and, as compensation, endless 
consciousness to her. The rhetorical function of prosopopeia, the positing of voice and face by 
means of language, becomes anthropomorphized within the figure of the cyborg Kusanagi. 
One could also describe this process as the phenomenalization of a voice, as the affirmation of 
the existence of the ghost. 
What is at work here is the performative and positional power of Kleist's discourse that 
produces those effects of hybridization, that it names, provisionally, opening up boundaries 
and resignifying terms and concepts. Perhaps it is "the pleasure in our monstrous selves," "the 
pleasure in the 'confusion of boundaries'", that leads us and Kleist towards "tak[ing] up the 
tools of technology and take 'responsibility in the [de]construction' of such boundaries" (Weil, 
1992, 161, my emphasis). Kleist's divine Gliedermann as well as the Puppet Master stand for 
figures that do not want to overcome the logic of representation or do not try to substantialize 
the non-representable; rather they offer possibilities of twisting and distortion, of the 
displacement and interruption of metaphysical concepts of identity and wholeness. As signifiers they rather incorporate a lack of signification, and this lack provokes new images, 
new figures that bridge this lack without overcoming it. 
© Anna Babka (Universität Wien) 
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